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What was distinctive about Apartheid in the 1950s, as compared
with the 1960s? How was it constructed, and how did it change?
Much of the academic and journalistic literature on Apartheid
pre-'reform' depicts it as the product of a single, long-term
'grand plan', pursued systematically and unfalteringly by the
National Party (NP) since its accession to power in 1948. Such
views are challenged in this paper, which argues that although
the Apartheid state has certainly been characterised by a
singular degree of co-ordination, planning and coercion, the
construction of Apartheid has not been a wholly linear,
systematic or monolithic project. The state's uncertainties,
conflicts, weaknesses, changes and failures, although far less
visible than its cohesiveness and triumphs, have also made their
mark on the construction of Apartheid. Moreover, some (but
obviously not all) of the premises and objectives of Apartheid
changed in fundamental ways at the onset of the 1960s. (The
presentation of these arguments is very brief and schematic,
being a summary of large chunks of my doctoral thesis.)
Brian Bunting (former editor of the Communist Party newspaper
'The Guardian' and then 'New Age') and Willem De Klerk (Afrikaner
writer and political commentator) have stated the 'grand plan1
view in its strongest terms, albeit from opposite ends of the
political spectrum. In his notable study of Apartheid, written
in 1969, Bunting asserted that
there has been nothing haphazard or laissez-
faire about Nationalist rule, in striking
contrast to previous regimes. Operating on
the basis of a preconceived ideology which
has undergone very little change in the last
fifteen years, the Nationalists have planned
their strategy with care and worked step by
step towards their goal. Nothing has been
left to chance. (1)
De Klerk too, sees the development of Apartheid as having been a
similarly thorough-going and unified project, spearheaded by
Verwoerd (first a Senator, then also Minister of Native Affairs,
and ultimately Prime Minister). In De Klerk's words,
for the next eighteen years, Verwoerd would
variously enlarge upon the themes of his
speech to the Senate of 1948. Certain
emphases would shift and refinements would
take place...These however, would by no
means be new to the apartheidsgedagte
[apartheid-idea]...On the whole, Verwoerd would
not deviate in the slightest degree from the
concept he had analysed, and the design
he had sketched in his first major speech as
a parliamentarian. He would revise nothing. (2)
Similar accounts of Verwoerd's role, as having inspired and
orchestrated the construction of Apartheid with his grand vision
and all-embracing plans for the future, are given by both
apologists and academic critics of the Apartheid regime. (3)
This sort of view also predominates in journalistic accounts of
Apartheid, which exercise considerable influence over popular
thinking on the subject. (4)
The 'grand plan' view is often not stated quite as baldly or
strongly as Bunting or De Klerk do. But we can recognise it in
the following familiar sorts of claims about Apartheid (pre-
•reform1). First, it is often argued that by 1948, the Sauer
Report - a confidential report produced internally for the NP in
1947 - equipped the newly elected Nationalist government with a
ready-made, if rudimentary, blueprint for the future. The
construction of Apartheid during the 1950s is thus seen as the
direct outgrowth of pre-planned, long-term strategies, which the
architects of state policy immediately proceeded to implement,
step by step. As David Welsh put it,
the Nationalists had appealed to the
electorate with the slogan *Apartheid1, the
tag given to a race policy that had been
drawn up by an internal commission and to
which the new regime would faithfully adhere.
(5).
Similar claims are made by Janet Robertson, Ralph Horwitz and
Douglas Hindson, for example. (6)
Second, the development of Apartheid through the 1950s and 1960s
is depicted, explicitly or implicitly, as having been essentially
continuous. The prominent policies of the 1960s - such as
population removals, restrictions on the scale of urban African
employment, 'homeland1 'self-government1 and 'development• - are
regarded as having been central to the design of Apartheid from
the start. Progress towards these measures is thus seen as
having been linear and cumulative, each step building on the
successes of the last. (7)
In short, therefore, the 'grand plan' view of Apartheid, stated
strongly, derives from the conviction that from the late 1940s,
the architects of state policy knew where they were heading and
how to get there, and proceeded unwaveringly, without changing
course, until the onset of 'reform' in the mid-1970s. In many
cases, a weaker version of this sort of argument is made, which
recognises hiccups and temporary hitches in the implementation of
the NP's blueprint. But the essential features of the 'grand
plan' thesis is reiterated, in so far as the development of
Apartheid is seen as having been fundamentally pre-planned,
continuous and cumulative.
The appeal of this sort of view is readily understandable.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Apartheid state did indeed
advance from strength to strength, with a greater degree of
ideological fervour than any of its predecessors. The NP
introduced an unprecedented scale of violence and repression into
blacks' encounters with the state. Organised black resistance
was smashed. The economic subordination of African labour,
already well-established by previous regimes, became more
systematic once the NP took power. A national system of labour
bureaux, introduced to monitor and control the distribution of
African labour, placed increasingly severe constraints on
Africans' freedom of movement and occupational choice. The
Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Education
Act, Immorality Act and others, laid the foundations for a more
rigid and thorough-going system of racial domination than had
existed to date. Moreover, several facets of Apartheid probably
did remain largely unchanged from 1948 through to the current
'reform' period. Obviously no-one could characterise the
policies of the Nationalist government as having been completely
haphazard or ad hoc.
Still, to endorse the 'grand plan' view is to go to the other
extreme, taking the NP's Promothean ideological discourses
wholly at face value. For, contrary to the NP's self-image of
ideological unity and continuity, the nature and future of
'Apartheid' has divided the Afrikaner nationalist alliance since
the mid-1940s. Of course, many basic features of Apartheid - such
as white minority rule, residential segregation, the prohibition
of interracial sex and marriage - were not contested, since the
commitment to white economic and political supremacy, and the
'complete eradication of any racial mixing' (8), was unanimous.
But the Nationalist alliance was deeply divided over the extent
to which the state should tolerate growing white dependence on
African labour and the concomitant expansion of the urban African
proletariat. Conflicting stances on this issue engendered
distinct blueprints for Apartheid, neither of which had trounced
the other by 1948. After the NP's election victory in 1948, the
state's stance on this issue, and the policies which followed
from it, were shaped in the first instance by the relative powers
of the competing Afrikaner factions within the Native Affairs
Department (NAD). The faction which dominated the design of
these policies during the 1950s, had lost much of its authority
within the NAD by the early 1960s. As a result, contrary to
notion of a single 'grand plan', we can discern two distinct
stages in the construction of NAD policy. A case study of the
NAD's policies of the 1950s and 1960s defies the 'grand plan'
view in another respect too. For, even within the broad framework
of a particular conception of Apartheid, the construction of NAD
policies took an uneven and often reactive course, over which
the NAD did not exercise complete control. Nor did the
implementation of NAD policy successfully achieve the objectives
for which it was designed. Indeed, these failures played an
important part in reorienting the NAD's policies after 1959/60.
In short therefore, the construction of NAD policies was neither
wholly linear, pre-planned or cumulative. In order to illustrate
these points, the remainder of the paper looks very briefly at
the NAD's stance on the issues of "economic integration" (of
Africans in the 'white' economy) and African urbanisation during
the 1950s; the sorts of policies issuing from it; the efficacy
with which these policies were implemented; and how and why these
policies changed after 1959.
Contrary to the received wisdom, the critical issue of the extent
to which the Apartheid system should accomodate the capitalist
demand for African labour, was the source of an unresolved
conflict within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance on the eve of
the 1948 election (9) . In his pioneering study of Afrikaner
nationalism, Dan O'Meara has argued that the NP was brought to
power by an Afrikaner nationalist class alliance, comprising
'Transvaal, Cape and Orange Free State farmers, specific
categories of white labour, and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie'
(10), which had thrown its weight behind a single, hegemonic
conception of Apartheid. But paradoxically, while stressing the
class differences within this alliance, O'Meara did not recognise
that these class divisions underlay competing conceptions of
Apartheid, neither of which was hegemonic. Afrikaners were
indeed united in their commitment to white supremacy; but as we
shall see, they were divided, largely (although not exclusively)
along class lines, over whether or not white supremacy was
threatened by deepening white dependence on African labour.
By 1948, the economic and political developments of the 1940s had
thrust this issue of "economic integration" to the centre-stage
of Afrikaner debate. The 1940s had seen the spectacular
expansion of manufacturing, accompanied by the rapid growth of
the urban African workforce. (Between 1935 and 1945, the number
of Africans employed in manufacturing rose by 119.1%, from 112
091 (which constituted 46.3% of the manufacturing workforce) to
245 538 (54.6% of the workforce) (11). Yet, as demand for
African labour grew, so too had the militancy and volatility of
the urban African proletariat. In contrast to the relative
quiescence of the 1930s, the war years ushered in a decade of
political turbulence, stirred up by desperate economic and social
conditions, coupled with rising expectations and assertiveness.
Much of the resistance was "informal and spontaneous - particular
local difficulties would reach a point at which they could no
longer be tolerated and would provoke a reaction by township
residents" (12). But, to the alarm of most whites, this surge of
grassroots militancy also gave new momentum to both the ANC and
the CPSA. By linking up with grassroots struggles, these
organisations succeeded in enlisting wider mass support (13).
African trade unions also grew in strength and size. By 1945,
over 100 000 African workers (approximately 40% of the African
industrial workforce) were unionised, as compared with 37 000 in
1939 (14). The years 1939-1945 also saw a record number of 304
strikes, involving 58 000 Africans, 'Coloureds' and Indians (15).
Over 70 000 African miners then went on strike in 1946.
The opposing factions within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance
held differing views of the 'problem' posed by the deepening
"economic integration" of Africans, and its appropriate solution.
The faction which I call 'purist' was drawn primarily from the
Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie and working class, although it did
command some support in business circles -such as the
Stellenbosch Chamber of Commerce. According to the purists, the
rising tide of urban African militancy during the 1940s was
symptomatic of the fundamental incompatability between 'political
segregation' and 'economic integration'. In their view, white
dependence on African labour would ultimately sound the death
knell of white supremacy. For, as the proportion of Africans in
the urban workforce continued to expand, so too would their
bargaining powers. These powers would be wielded with growing
assertiveness and militancy, thanks to rising political
expectations, borne of improving standards of living and levels
of education in the cities. The sheer size of the urban African
proletariat, it was argued, would ensure that an African
insurrection against white minority rule would ultimately
triumph, since "even repeated recourse to force majeure is
powerless in the end against the force of numbers" (16) . The
purists therefore regarded "total segregation" - including
"economic segregation" - as the only reliable safeguard of white
supremacy. Apartheid, in their view, should aim at the gradual
but steady extrication of African labour from the 'white *
economy .(17) To this end, they claimed, it would be essential for
the state to impose quotas on the permissible numbers of Africans
working in 'white' areas; create incentives to accelerate
mechanisation, and launch a concerted drive to stimulate white
immigration. In addition. Apartheid should include a thorough-
going programme of population resettlement, to remove Africans
from 'white' areas of the country to their rightful fhomes' in
the reserves. (18)
The opposing faction was dominated by Afrikaner agricultural,
industrial and commercial capital. Predictably, in these
circles, there was far less enthusiasm at the prospect of
"economic segregation". In their view, the political ferment of
the 1940s was caused by a weak state, rather than any underlying
contradiction between the imperatives of white supremacy and the
growth of the African workforce. Provided the state was suitably
fortified to subvert the threat of African unionisation and
populist insurrection, they maintained, there was no need for
whites to forego their access to African labour. Instead,
Apartheid should be eminently "practical":
It must be acknowledged that the non-white
worker already constitutes an integral part
of our economic structure, that he is now so
enmeshed in the spheres of our economic
life that for the first fifty to one hundred
years (if not longer), total segregation is
pure wishful thinking. Any government which
disregards this irrefutable fact will soon
discover that it is no longer in a position
to govern. (19)
In terms of this "practical" blueprint for Apartheid, curtailing
the further growth of urbanised African communities would be
likewise an unnecessary and economically damaging undertaking.
As the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) told the Tomlinson
Commission, "stabilised" labour was preferable to "migratory"
labour (20). So Africans should be permitted into urban areas
provided they were bona fide workseekers, and they should not be
prevented from settling there permanently with their families.
The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), representing the
interests of white farmers, concurred. (21)
The Sauer Report, treated by many scholars as the source of
Apartheid policies, was in fact an internally contradictory and
ambiguous document - contradictory because it wove together
strands from these, mutually exclusive conceptions of Apartheid,
and ambiguous because it did not finally choose between them.
The Report both endorsed and qualified the principle of 'total
segregation1, and simultaneously proposed some policy measures to
limit white access to African labour, and others which would
expedite the expansion of the African workforce. (22) Clearly,
the origins of the Apartheid policies of the 1950s cannot be
explained by the presence of a single, hegemonic blueprint for
Apartheid. We have to examine which of the competing blueprints
for Apartheid gained the upper hand within the state during the
1950s, and why.
The conflict within the NP and the state over 'economic
integration' and African urbanisation, persisted throughout the
1950s, and on into the 1960s - although by 1960, the 'practical*
position had become more reformist and the 'purist' position less
extreme (see later). O'Meara has claimed that the views of
Afrikaner capital were hegemonic from the start. But he under-
estimated the size and influence of the purist faction. In his
view, it was merely a small group of politically marginal, ivory-
tower intellectuals, who championed the cause of 'total
segregation1 (23). In fact, however, this position commanded
strong support within the Dutch Reformed Church - particularly
during the early 1950s (24). And several NP MPs - including
Senator Jan De Klerk (the second Minister of Labour), Donges
(first Minister of the Interior), N. Diedrichs and D. De Wet Nel
- called tori immediate moves towards the goal of neconomic
apartheid" (25). It is important to bear these conflicts in
mind, as a backdrop to our understanding of state policy in the
1950s; otherwise, it is difficult to make sense of the change of
course in policies towards Africans in urban areas, which became
evident after 1959 (as will be shown later).
Throughout the 1950s, then, as A. Hepple, leader of the South
African Labour Party, declared, "we have heard the NP speak with
many voices on the question of their Native policy" (26). But
in the midst of these controversies, one set of voices wrested
much of the authority to define the notion of Apartheid which
shaped the making of state policy. The Minister of Native
Affairs occupied a privileged position in the construction of
Apartheid, since his portfolio covered the key problem area for
Apartheid - the so-called 'Native question1. Seizing upon this
strategic advantage, Jansen (the first Nationalist Minister of
Native Affairs) and Verwoerd (his successor) proceeded to enlarge
the resources and enhance the prestige and power of the Native
Affairs Department (NAD) within the state.
Once the NP had been installed in government, the NAD's most
immediate and pressing concern was the achievement of "better
control" (27) over the employment and residence of Africans in
the urban areas. As we have seen, this was exactly the policy
area which was most controversial and contested within the
Afrikaner nationalist alliance. The Sauer Report, moreover, had
failed to provide a consistent, ready-made solution. How then,
did architects of NAD policy respond to conflicts within
Afrikanerdom over meaning and appropriate course for Apartheid?
The relative political influence of the competing positions on
'Apartheid' within the NAD depended upon several variables
notably, the relative powers of the opposing factions within the
Nationalist alliance; the distribution of power between the NAD
and local authorities; and various pressures and constraints of
the historical moment. As we shall see, the particular
configuration of these variables during the early 1950s, when the
foundations of the first phase of Apartheid were laid, gave the
•practical' conception of Apartheid a greater (although by no
means total) hold over NAD policy, than its purist adversary. By
the onset of the 1960s, however, each of these factors had
changed, resulting in turn in a change in the premises and
direction of NAD policy.
The purist faction was not without influence within the NAD.
W.M. Eiselin, appointed by Jansen as Secretary for Native
Affairs, was a founder member of the South African Bureau of
Racial Affairs (SABRA) which championed the 'total segregation*
cause. Verwoerd, who took over as Minister of Native Affairs in
1951, created a research department dominated by SABRA
intellectuals. Also, D. De Wet Nel, another founder member of
SABRA, was appointed to lead the Native Affairs Commission, a
body which advised the Minister of Native Affairs on policy
matters.
But NAD policy was more 'practical' than it was purist, since it
was premised on the 'practical' acceptance of the growing white
dependence on African labour and the resultant expansion of the
urban African proletariat, as economic necessities. As Verwoerd
told a meeting with the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM)
and Federated Chambers of Industries (FCI) in 1951, "the
implementation of Apartheid would take account of economic
reality" (28). The NAD accepted that "the economic organisation
of the land and interior will have the same character as it has
now" (29) . The ensuing political threats would be dealt with by
intensifying the state's control over African political
organisations and trade unions, and by imposing a more rigorous
and aggressive influx control policy.
Central to the design of the NAD's influx control policy was the
ideological and administrative differentiation between Africans
who were "detribalised" and "urbanised '•', and those who were
still i' tribalised". The architects of NAD policy went along
with the "practical" blueprint in accepting that "detribalised"
city-dwellers, who had no 'tribal' ties or base in the reserves,
had the • residential right' to remain in the urban areas
permanently, whether or not they were employed there. As
Verwoerd put it.
a little less than one-third [of the African
population] lives and works in the cities, of
whom a section have become detribalised and
urbanised._ The Apartheid policy takes this
reality into account. (30)
However, sharing some of the purists' anxieties about the growth
of the urban proletariat, the NAD set out to freeze all further
urbanisation. In future, only migrant workers would be permitted
the join the urban African community, and only for the duration
of their employment contracts. Moreover, in order to limit the
number of migrant workers drawn into the cities, an urban labour
preference principle^was built into the influx control policy:
employers in the cities would be compelled to draw on the
services of the urbanised unemployed before importing additional
migrant workers. As well as extracting maximum economic
advantage from the resident urban African population, the ULPP
was designed to ensure that a greater proportion of African
workseekers from the reserves, were redirected to the farms,
having been refused entry into cities with existing labour
surpluses. The NAD thus claimed to have found economically
'practical1 ways of limiting the growth of the urban African
proletariat.
The NAD declared its strategy as a "short-term" measure,
postponing the decision as to whether the preservation of
Apartheid would ultimately require the measures advocated by the
purists, for "future generations and their policies" (3D. This
characterisation of NAD strategy was partly an ideological device
to accomodate the purist position in some way. (Jansen and
Verwoerd were determined to dismiss the UP's jibes about
dissension and confusion within Afrikaner ranks over the meaning
of 'Apartheid'.) But it also reflected the newly elected
government's priorities, of making a visible impact on immediate
problems, and consolidating and extending its power. The long-
term future of Apartheid was less of an issue at this early
stage. Inevitably, however, short-term policies have long-term
implications; in this case, the NAD introduced an influx control
policy which set back still further the prospects of removing the
urbanised African population to the reserves and curtailing
'economic integration1 in the manner proposed by the purists.
As I suggested earlier, the NAD's position on 'economic
integration' and African urbanisation is explained by a
combination of factors. Afrikaner capital, although not
hegemonic within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance, exercised
considerable powers within the policy-making process. During the
early 1950s, as suggested earlier, the SAAU and AHI endorsed more
or less the same blueprint for Apartheid - one which was marked
by its acceptance of the economic inevitability of unrestricted
'economic integration' and continuing, but controlled, African
urbanisation. Jointly, they constituted a powerful lobby within
the NAD for 'practical' Apartheid. Indeed, the interests of
white farmers, as represented by the SAAU, were afforded a
regular and privileged hearing within the NAD. As a NAD
memorandum explained.
there is in existence a liason committee
(usually referred to as 'Die
Skakelkommittee *) between the Minister of
Native Affairs and his Department on the one
hand, and the SAAU and various provincial
agricultural unions on the other. All Native
labour matters affecting agriculture, such as
questions of the supply of labour, wages, and
conditions of employment and policy
generally, are discussed with this Committee
which is presided over either by the
Minister or the Secretary of Native Affairs,
and which meets as and when necessary. (32)
The NAD's legislation for controlling the numbers of Africans
living and working in urban areas - a matter of direct concern to
farmers - was therefore drafted in close consultation with this
Skakelkommittee.
The interests of Afrikaner industry and commerce also weighed
heavily upon the NAD. During the 1940s, the Broederbond had
spearheaded the so-called Economic Movement, to advance the cause
of Afrikaner business. Due largely to its efforts and
investments, between 1939 and 1949, the number of Afrikaner-
owned manufacturing concerns increased from 1 293 to 3 385, with
turnover expanding from £6 000 000 to £43 000 000. Commercial
establishments numbered 9 585 by 1949, as compared with 2 428 in
1939, and their turnover shot up from £28 000 000 to £203 700 000
(33). However, as O'Meara points out, "many of these (new
businesses) were small and under-capitalised" (34). Were the NAD
to have taken a purist line on Apartheid, insisting that
employers make proportionately more use of white (and therefore
more costly) labour and invest more in mechanisation, many of
these new Afrikaner businesses would have collapsed. Ironically,
the purists' proposals would have inflicted a far heavier burden
on Afrikaner industrial capital than its English-speaking
counterpart. For, most of the larger capital-intensive industries
capable of surviving such an onslaught from the state, were owned
by English-speakers. The 1950 'Ekonomiese Volkskongres',
however, reiterated the NP's commitment to enhancing the
prosperity and competitiveness of Afrikaner business.
The interests of Afrikaner farmers and industrialists do not
wholly explain the NAD's commitment to a 'practical* approach to
Apartheid. Other factors derived from the limited powers and
capabilities of the NAD. In at least one important respect, the
economic organisation of the country was not in the hands of the
NAD, nor any other central government department. Decisions as
to how much urban land would be set aside for industrial
development rested with the elected city councils which, together
with the municipalities, constituted the local arm of the state.
As the NAD was well aware, the local authorities had a vested
interest in the expansion of local industries, which boosted the
employment prospects and general economic prosperity of their
areas. During the 1950s, the NAD was not yet strong enough to
provoke a confrontation with the local authorities by attempting
to usurp these powers. When spelling out NAD policy in 1951,
Jansen could therefore do little more than issue "warnings
against the unlimited expansion of industries in our large urban
areas" (35).
The local authorities geared the NAD towards 'practical' policies
in other respects too. During the early 1950s, the local
authorities in many of the larger cities - such as Johannesburg,
Durban and Cape Town - were dominated by the United Party (UP) .
The policy preferences of these local authorities were therefore
strongly aligned with the recommendations of the Fagan
Commission, endorsed by the UP. Indeed, their evidence to this
Commission had had a considerable impact on its findings. In the
NAD too, the influence of the larger local authorities was well-
established (36). For, the NAD's administrative activities,
undertaken by the Native Affairs Commissioners, were concentrated
in the rural areas. It was the local authorities alone who had
acquired experience and expertise in dealing with "the
bewildering complexity of urban African administration" (37),
and the larger local authorities whose opinion carried the most
weight in these matters.
Furthermore, the co-operation of the local authorities was
indispensable to the implementation of NAD policy. The
distribution of control over Africans in urban areas, between the
NAD and local authorities, had been ambiguous ever since the Act
of Union ruled on the matter in 1909. One section of the Act had
given local authorities control over municipal affairs, while
another section gave the central government control over African
affairs (38). At SABRA's suggestion, in the early 1950s,
Verwoerd took a few steps to strengthen the NAD's hand. For
example, municipal Managers of fNon-EuTOpean Affairs' ^ were
required to hold a licence from the Minister of Native Affairs,
which could be revoked if Departmental policy was flouted. But
during the 1950s, the NAD had neither the strength nor the
resources radically to restructure the system of urban
administration. The local authorities therefore remained the
principal agents of Departmental policy in urban areas, with
considerable powers and authority.
Finally, the 'practical• lobby was further strengthened by the
political weaknesses of the newly elected Nationalist government,
uncertain of re-election. The NP had won the 1948 election with
a small majority of seats, but only 39.4% of the vote (39).
During the NP*s first term of office; when several of the key
Apartheid laws of the 1950s were passed, the architects of NAD
?olicy were cautious, and intent on dispelling UP accusationshat Apartheid was the work of ideological zealots with no
understanding of, or concern for, its economically damaging
consequences. Also, with an initial time-table of five years,
careful long-term planning was inappropriate.
The impact of the NAD's policies on the lives of Africans was
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brutal and traumatic, marking a new order and intensity of state
repression. Police harrassment and brutality became commonplace.
As the influx control restrictions were tightened, so the number
of people 'endorsed out' to a life of even harsher poverty in the
reserves, grew. So too did the numbers imprisoned for a myriad
'petty contraventions' of the pass laws. As Blokes Modisane
remarked caustically, "in our curious society, going to
jail...was a social institution, something to be expected; it was
Harry Bloom who wrote: more Africans go to prison than to school"
(40). But from the NAD's point of view, its influx control
policies failed to provide the desired degree of control over the
number of Africans living and working in urban areas.
The NAD's objectives were partly thwarted by the legislative
process itself. As we have seen, the NAD was prepared to
concede that ''detribalised" Africans had the (l residential right"
to remain in the urban area in which they were currently living,
whether or not they minister*<fto white needs. Having become
fully "urbanised", Verwoerd told parliament, these people were
entitled to "certain guarantees, security and stability" (41)
including protection against removal if unemployed. But
membership of this relatively privileged ndetribalised " group was
very narrowly defined, limited to Africans who had been "born and
continuously resident" in the area. In order to effect the
desired freeze on further African urbanisation, the NAD intended
to refuse any African who had not been born in an urban area, the
right to remain there permanently. This proposal met with a
broad front of opposition - from the ANC and 3&CP$A, the
politically moderate Location Advisory Boards' Congress, ASSOCOM,
FCI, as well as within the House of Assembly and the Senate. The
passage of the Native laws Amendment Bill, which contained the
NAD's principal influx control measures, is an interesting
illustration of the effects of opposition on the construction of
Apartheid in the early 1950s. But the details cannot be covered
here. (42) Suffice it to say that Verwoerd was pressured into
modifying his original clause conferring 'residential rights*, so
that it encompassed two extra groups of qualifiers. First, men
and women who had worked continuously in an urban area for ten
years with one employer or fifteen years for several employers,
were now accepted as permanent residents of the area, whether or
not they subsequently became unemployed. And the wives and
dependent children of men with 'residential rights' were also
recognised as members of the 'urbanised1 community. Of course,
the terms of section 10(1) of the Urban Areas Act, which
allocated these * rights', were still extremely restrictive. But
Verwoerd's concessions had important administrative implications.
During the 1950s, the NAD was prepared to allow •economic
integration* to proceed unchecked in the cities, partly because
it was confident of its powers to restrict the growth of the
urban African proletariat to the 'practical' minimum. As we have
seen, this was to be achieved in two ways. Firstly, the urban
labour preference policy (ULPP) was designed to eliminate "large"
(43) urban labour surpluses. Declaring the need "to employ every
possible Bantu legally domiciled in town" (44) , the NAD intended
the ULPP to ensure "the placement of city Bantu in jobs which are
now in practice reserved for migrant labourers" (45). This
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included urban women and "juveniles" (aged 15-20); by making
"better use" of their labour, the NAD hoped to diminish the
demand for additional migrant labour. And secondly, all future
migration to the citj.es would be on a temporary basis large urban
labour surpluses.
Ironically, however, the influx control legislation unwittingly
introduced substantial obstacles on both fronts. The ULPP was
premised upon the NAD's capacity to "channel" urbanised Africans
into specified jobs ahead of migrant workers; but the newly
amended section 10(1) (a),(b)&(c) of the Urban Areas Act gave
"urbanised" men, women and youths the legal right to resist
taking jobs which they did not want, remaining unemployed if they
chose to.
Partly because of section 10(1), therefore, the ULPP was largely
inoperative (46) . Instead of restricting the growth of the urban
population by eliminating urban unemployment, by the end of the
1950s, levels of urban unemployment rose (47) alongside the
continuing expansion of the migrant workforce (48) and the urban
African population at large (49). In the words of the Botha
Report (1962), an inter-departmental committee of inquiry into
"idleness and unemployment among urban Bantu",
the anomaly exists, that workseekers from
outside the urban areas are admitted in,
despite the fact that there is already a
surplus in the towns. (50)
The NAD also failed to prevent the growth of the permanent,
urbanised community in the cities. Again, the influx control
legislation was part of the problem, for the amended section 10
subverted the possibility of a legal freeze on further
urbanisation. Women from rural areas who married urbanised men
were entitled to settle in the urban areas, and raise their
children there. Also, men who had been born in rural areas were
entitled to settle permanently in urban areas after a long period
of registered employment there. As the NAD's policy-makers
complained in later years, contrary to intention, section 10
licenced
the phenomenon of continuous growth of the
urban Bantu population...irrespective of
whether or not the labour requirements of a
particular urban area justified such a large
urban Bantu population. (51)
The NAD was aware of these gaps in its control as the decade wore
on, and responded to them by trying to plug legal loopholes and
extend the powers of its bureaucracy. But by 1961, as we shall
see, the then renamed Department of Bantu Administration and
Development (BAD) had begun to change course, having come to
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perceive its failings as the symptoms of fundamental limitations
in the very premises and methods of its 'practical' policies.
The first signs.of the impending shift were evident in 195 9 , with
the introduction of the new 'homeland self-government' policy.
As Verwoerd (then Prime Minister) told parliament in 1961, this
policy represented a departure from the government's original
intentions; it "is not what we wanted to see", he said (52).
During the 1950s, the reserves were treated essentially as
reservoirs of African labour at the disposal of whites. The
commitment to 'separate development' was largely the ideological
means to legitimise the denial of the franchise to Africans
living in the country. The reserves were defined as the
permanent political 'home' of all Africans, as a means of
excluding them from the polity of 'white' South Africa. But
Africans had no political rights within the reserves (53). By
the 1960s, however, 'separate development' was vaunted as a means
of allocating Africans the 'right' to 'self-government' in their
own 'homelands'.
The notion of 'separate development' was thus redefined within a
new ideological discourse on 'multi-nationalism1 and 'ethnic
self-determination' (54-). As Blaar Coetzee (then deputy Minister
of BAD) put it in 1966,
our policy is...'multi-nationalism1, and
seeing that all nationalisms are exclusive,
it is obvious that each group must have its
own sphere where it can enjoy and exercise
in full the privileges of a free society.
(5$)
These shifts formed part of the state's defences against
increasingly hostile international condemnation of Apartheid
during the late 1950s. Nationalist struggles for independence in
colonial Africa during the late 1950s had focussed international
attention on the oppressive regime in South Africa, which put it
under severe pressure to address the problem of African political
rights. In an attempt to win some legitimacy in the eyes of its
critics, the government's 'homeland' solution mimicked the
language of 'ethnic self-determination1 used by African
nationalists up north. But this strategy was seen expressly as a
means of
buying the white man his freedom and the
right to retain domination in what is his
country, settled for him by his forefathers.
(56)
The effects of an ideological discourse transcend its immediate
instrumentality, however. The new language of ethnicity and
"multi-nationalism" also heralded the beginnings of a fundamental
shift in the BAD's attitude towards Africans in the so-called
'white' urban areas. As we saw earlier, the basis of the NAD's
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•practical1 policies of the 1950s had been the rigid ideological
and administrative differentiation between "tribalised" and
"urbanised" "detribalised" Africans. Recognising that
"detribalised" Africans had lost their 'tribal* affiliations,
the NAD conceded that their permanent home was in the urban
areas. But by 1959, this 'practical* premise was under attack:
the BAD indicated a new intention to level the status of all
Africans, inside and outside the 'urbanised' group. In marked
contrast to the language of 'practical' politics, the BAD now
discarded its earlier declaration that the "fact" of
"detribalisation" entitled "urbanised" Africans to certain
"guarantes, security and stability". Indeed, the very .notion of
"detribalisation" was scorned. Stressing the fundamental ethnic
unity of Africans in the urban and rural areas, the BAD expressly
rejected the idea that there were "two kinds of Africans" (57)»
those who were "urbanised" and those who retained ties with the
reserves. As Eiselin explained in 1959, "our policy only
recognises one Bantu community in its ethnic sub-divisions" (58).
Or, as the then deputy Minister (B. Coetzee) and Minister (M.C.
Botha) put it in later years,
whatever the world may say, the Bantu city
dweller is someone who still year's for his
homeland, and that yearning must be
stimulated. (59)
The Bantu in white urban areas cannot be
dissected from their national relatives in
the homelands, not even if they were born
here in the white area. The Bantu in the
white urban areas and those in the Bantu
homelands are linked together into one nation
by bonds of language...descent, kinship,
tribal relations, custom, pride, material
interests and many other matters, (60)
Using this new language of 'ethnic' 'unity1, the BAD now
denounced the concept of "residential rights", which had
underpinned the influx control policy of the 1950s. The
memorandum defending the 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act declaimed
the notion of "residential rights" as an indefensible "deviation"
from the "principles of separate development" (61). Whereas the
purpose of "separate development" was to allocate Africans their
•own sphere1 in their "ethnic" "homelands", argued the BAD, the
policies initiated in the early 1950s had
granted permanence.*.to Bantu.•.in European
areas. Contrary to the basic aims...of
'separate development'...the Bantu has been
allowed to make his home wherever he elects
in the whole of South Africa, and this
practice • has necessarily created the
impression that...the Bantu...can lay claim
to the same rights as Europeans in European
areas. (62)
By 1959, therefore, the BAD had announced its dissatisfaction
with its existing policies, departing from its earlier limited
acceptance of African urbanisation. However, the decisive push
into the second phase of BAD policy came with the escalation of
urban African resistance after 1959, culminating in the
widespread turbulence after the Sharpeville massacres of March
I960.
The wave of protest in the urban areas which rose in the late
1950s drew its momentum partly from the shop floor. Between 1955
and 1958, the number of industrial disputes and people on strike
nearly doubled over the levels of the early 1950s (63)
However, the main thrust of resistance came from within the
townships, beginning with the squatter settlements of Cato Manor
Durban, early in 1959. Initially provoked by opposition to the
state's plans to remove African squatters from the Cato Manor
area, the disturbances raged for several months, inflamed by
municipal raids on illegal beer stills. By August 1959, the
Manager of the Durban Non-European Affairs Department, Bourquin,
called a meeting with the Minister of BAD to declare the local
authority's impotence and defeat in Cato Manor. As Bourquin put
it,
the authority of the Durban City Council -
the civil governmental authority for the area
- has been challenged and overthrown. That
statement is not an exaggeration of the
facts, for it is true to say that the City
Council has beeji defeated at Cato Manor, and
cannot restore its authority without the
fullest co-operation and most active
assistance of the Government. (64)
The tumult-jln Durban made headlines in the overseas press. But
this was a small taste of the more severe and damaging
international censure soon to come. In December 1959, the PAC
and ANC both unveiled plans for national 'anti-pass' campaigns.
Their protests took an unexpectedly dramatic turn in March 1960,
when the South African Police opened fire on a crovd of PAC
protestors in Sharpeville, Vereeniging. Sixty-nine people were
killed and 180 injured. As the unrest spread to other areas of
the country, a state of emergency was declared, and a political
storm broke. The injustices of Apartheid now the subject of
heated criticism abroad. South Africa withdrew from the
Commonwealth. International confidence in the country's economic
prospects dived, and during 1960, the country suffered a net
outflow of R180 000 000, and "a balance of payments crisis more
severe than any experienced since 1932" (65).
As these economic and political crises dawned, the Afrikaner
nationalist alliance was once again thrown into turmoil over the
long-controversial issues of 'economic integration1 and African
urbanisation. Recall that in the late 1940s, it was the
upsurgence of African militancy in the townships which had
concentrated Afrikaners* attention on the potential political
threats levelled by 'economic integration1. So too in 1960; long-
standing anxieties about the political dangers of an expanding
urban African proletariat were brought to the fore once more.
The Afrikaner nationalist alliance, NP, and the BAD in
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Commonwealth. International confidence in the country's economic
prospects dived, and during 1960, the country suffered a net
outflow of R180 000 000, and "a balance of payments crisis more
severe than any experienced since 1932" (65).
As these economic and political crises dawned, the Afrikaner
nationalist alliance was once again thrown into turmoil over the
long-controversial issues of 'economic integration' and African
urbanisation. Recall that in the late 1940s, it was the
upsurgence of African militancy in the townships which had
concentrated Afrikaners' attention on the potential political
threats levelled by 'economic integration1. So too in 1960; long-
standing anxieties about the political dangers of an expanding
urban African proletariat were brought to the fore once more.
The Afrikaner nationalist alliance, NP, and the BAD in
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particular, entered a phase of intensive reflection and
reassessment of existing policies towards Africans in urban
areas. Conflicting verdicts were passed. (66). But the BAD
took the view that the existing influx control policy had been
proven too weak a defence aginst the threat of urban
insurrection. After a decade of 'practical' influx control
policies, militant 'agitation' in the townships had escalated,
rather than diminished. A conference of Chief Bantu Affairs
Commissioners in 1961 pronounced the labour bureaux system to
date "a complete failure" (67). When reflecting on the
performance of NAD policies during the 1950s, • Departmental
inquiries, identified gaping holes in the BAD*s control over the
urban African labour market and the urban population at large and
diagnosed these shortcomings as symptoms of the inadequacies of
its earlier * practical1 approach to the urban areas (68) . Within
the BAD, it was therefore agreed that it .was now necessary and
possible to take far more aggressive steps to reduce the size of
the urban African proletariat, by initiating new forms of social
and economic engineering. This is not to say that the BAD
completely abandoned all its existing policies. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, after 1960, the BAD instituted certain departures
from its previous policies, based on a new stance on both
'economic integration' and African urbanisation. The remainder
of this paper looks first, at the substance of these changes, and
then explains why they were introduced.
Throughout the 1960s, the successive Ministers and Deputy
Ministers of the BAD spearheaded moves to curb white dependence
on African labour. Their arguments echoed some of the warnings
which had been sounded by SABRA during the late 940s, that
'economic integration1 was Apartheid's Achilles Heel. By having
allowed industrial dependence on African labour to proceed
unchecked, the BAD declared, the state was now sitting on a
political time bomb. As De Wet Nel, then Minister of BAD,
declared in 1964, "if Apartheid should fail, it would probably be
due to uncontrolled economic integration" (69).
The BAD did not advocate the wholesale extrication of African
labour from the so-called 'white' areas; but it did deviate from
the premises of the policies drafted in the 1950s, by underlining
the need to curtail the scale of 'economic integration' in the
cities. The BAD now recogised that an influx control policy
limiting the supply of African labour to the cities in accordance
with the prevailing demand - as had been the case in the 1950s -
was too weak an instrument for containing the urban population
growth. As Blaar Coetzee explained in 1966,
how must we deal with the problem of the
increase of Bantu labour on the
Witwatersrand?...It is clear that influx
control can never be more than an instrument
to make the flow of Bantu labour as orderly
as possible. It can never be a solution.
(70)
16
Determined to institute "positive measures" to deal with the
"problem", the BAD introduced successive bills making provision
for labour quotas limiting the maximum permissible ratio of
African to white workers in the urban areas. The first attempt
was made in 1960, in the 'Bantu in European Areas Bill, hastily
drafted by BAD lawyers in the wake of the Sharpeville shootings.
But this Bill was dropped as hurriedly as it was circulated,
following strong protests from local authorities and organised
commerce and industry. A similar fate befell the first draft of
the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, which also made provision for
labour quotas. But in 1967, the Physical Planning Act was passed,
legally limiting the number of Africans employed in a specified
area or class of employment. (The Act also gave the government
new powers to control the allocation of land for industrial
development).
After 1960, the BAD's controls over African residence in urban
areas also changed, in line with its changed stance on African
urbanisation. Extending and intensifying the attack launched on
the concept of "residential rights" in 1959, the 1960s saw
repeated attempts by the BAD to scrap section 10 of the Urban
Areas Act (which enshrined these "rights"). These efforts
foundered; but the BAD succeeded in whittling away the
"guarantees, security and stability" associated with
10(1)(a),(b)&(c) rights in other, less direct ways. Acquiring
these 'rights' became dependent on the availability of approved
accomoelation. Section 10(1 M e ) was tightened. The introduction
of the so-called 'call-in card' system in 1968 made it compulsory
for all migrant workers to return annually to their districts of
origin, thus preventing a migrant from notching up ten or fifteen
years continuous service. However, the most dramatic and
draconian blow to the principle underpinning section 10, as
introduced in the 1952 legislation, was delivered by the BAD's
urban removals policy. Instituted formally in 1961 (71), this
policy grew more aggressive as the decade wore on. It was a
policy which expressly overruled the terms of section 10: all
Africans - irrespective of whether or not they had
10(l)(a)(b)&(c) rights -were liable for removal to the
'homelands' if they were "unproductive" - that is, if they were
not ministering to white needs.
How do we explain these changes of course within the BAD? As was
suggested earlier, the BAD's new policies were constructed within
the ideological and legal framework of the "homeland self-
government" policy. But this does not fully explain the BAD1s
drive to restructure its urban policies. After all, the sorts of
moves initiated by the BAD after 1959 had been dismissed earlier
in the decade as 'impractical' and unnecessary. The NAD had then
accepted unrestricted 'economic integration' as economically
indispensable, and had yielded to the "reality" of
"detribalisation". Yet, by 1960, the "practical" barriers to the
BAD's new urban policy objectives were larger, rather than
smaller. For, the size of the urban African workforce had grown,
signifying the still deeper dependence of industrial
profitability on African labour. And the size of the
"detribalised" population had likewise expanded further.
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We saw earlier in the paper that a combination of three principal
variables explained why, in the early 1950s, the NAD was
predisposed towards a largely 'practical* stance on 'economic
integration' and African urbanisation: 1) the power of Afrikaner
capitalist interests, relative to those of petty-bourgeois
groupings such as SABRA, within the NAD; 2), the power of local
authorities within the NAD; 3) the NP's electoral uncertainties,
which made for a cautious, short-term approach. By 1960, all
three factors had altered. Firstly, a new alliance of the SAAU,
SABRA and the Broederbond held sway over BAD policy-making;
secondly, the BAD had positioned itself for a frontal attack on
the local authorities; and thirdly, the NP had considerably
strengthened its grip on the reigns of power. These changes are
examined briefly in turn.
During the early 1950s, the AHI and SAAU had shared essentially
the same views on urban Africans. Both had been confident that
continuing 'economic integration' and African urbanisation were
not inherently threatening to the preservation of white
supremacy. Throughout the 1950s, the SAAU continued to enjoy a
privileged hearing within the NAD. Indeed, the 1960 'Bantu in
European Areas' bill was drafted in consultation with the SAAU's
'Skakelkommittee', which had continued to meet regularly with the
Department (72). However, as the decade passed, the SAAU and
AHI parted company over the issue of state policy towards urban
Africans. The AHI remained resolutely 'practical1 and
increasingly reformist. After the Sharpeville shootings, the AHI,
along with ASSOCOM, FCI, SEIFSA and the Chamber of Mines, urged
the BAD to relax its controls over urbanised Africans, in order
to cultivate the support of a "loyal middle-class type of Bantu"
(73). The SAAU, on the other hand, had grown increasingly wary
of policies which unwittingly increased the size and bargaining
power of the urban proletariat (74).
The SAAU's anxieties, brought to a head by the Sharpeville
crisis, were shared by the dominant grouping within SABRA, which
also had a tight hold over policy-making within the BAD. During
the 1950s, SABRA had undergone its own internal conflicts and
realignments. Initially, the organisation came out strongly in
favour of 'total segregation1, facilitated by an ambitious
programme of 'development' in the reserves. But by the late
1950s, a large faction within SABRA had shifted ground. The
division was provoked by the publication of the Tomlinson
Commission, which had been briefed to examine the prospects for
the socio-economic development of the reserves. According to Nic
Olivier, the Commission had been appointed by Jansen at SABRA's
behest, and SABRA's influence over its findings was marked. (75)
Indeed, the Commission reiterated SABRA's original view that the
reserves should be developed into economically viable entities.
Verwoerd, however, rejected Tomlinson's programme of development
as too costly, and proposed a more limited 'five year' plan. By
the late 1950s, Verwoerd's powers within SABRA had expanded to
the point where the dominant faction had succumbed to his view,
softening its stance on 'total segregation1, calling merely for
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stricter controls on African urbanisation and 'economic
integration1, within a framework of the limited development of
the reserves. Only a minority of what John Lazar calls the
"visionaries" stood by the original prescription for thorough-
going 'total segregation' (76). By 1959, the pro-Verwoerdian
faction in SABRA was powerfully represented within the BAD. In
addition to SABRA's long-standing influence over the BAD•s
research division and the Native Affairs Commission (see
earlier), members of the dominant SABRA grouping now monopolised
key policy-making positions in the BAD. After Verwoerd left the
BAD to become Prime Minister in 1958, the positions of Minister,
deputy Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs were all filled
by powerful members of SABRA - D. De Wet Nel, M.C. Botha, and W.
Eiselin. As founder members of SABRA, they shared a long-
standing suspicion of the 'practical' position on 'economic
integration' and African urbanisation taken by the AHI. But
their antipathy towards the AHI's reformist proposals was
heightened by further conflicts within SABRA triggered by the
Sharpeville shootings.. The 1960 SABRA conference, held a month
later in April, was dominated by debates over urban Africans. The
'visionaries', recognising Verwoerd's intransigence over 'total
segregation', adopted essentially the same stance as the AHI -
calling for a more co-optive, ameliorative approach towards the
urban areas. Ironically, the AHI received the backing of the
staunchest proponents of 'total segregation'! But support for
the 'visionaries' within SABRA continued to decline, until by
1961, they were ousted altogether as the pro-Verwoerdian faction
mounted a coup of all office-bearing positions. The
marginalisation of the visionaries within SABRA heralded a
similar fate for their reformist recommendations, along with
those of the AHI, within the BAD.
The official SABRA position on Africans in urban areas coincided
with, and was itself dominated by, that of the.Broederbond, which
had by then acquired unprecedented powers over the shaping of
Apartheid policy. As John Lazar has explained, Verwoerd's
successful bid to succeed Strijdom as Prime Minister was backed
by the Broederbond. Once installed in office, Verwoerd then
proceeded to expand the Broederbond's powers within the state
further, as a means of bolstering his own hold over the course of
state policy. And the interests represented by the Broederbond
were essentially those of the group which had come to dominate
Apartheid policy-making in the NP: "a powerful, economically
ambitious, politically assertive, urbanised grouping -
spearheaded by Afrikaner intellectuals, teachers, professionals
and bureaucrats". (77)
With access to improved educational
opportunities, as well as state patronage and
employment - and with a resurgent Broederbond
as a vehicle for its demands - this grouping
assumed a central decision-making role within
the NP, and in the overall reshaping of
Apartheid ideology. (78)
The second factor which explains the BAD's change of course after
i q
1959 was its growing assertiveness and aggressiveness vis a vis
local authorities. In the early 1950s, the NAD had been
thoroughly dependent on the co-operation and the expertise of the
local authorities, whose lobby for 'practical' policies was
therefore a powerful one. But as the 1950s progressed, the NAD
had expanded, increasing the resources and expertise necessary
for Departmental officers to take over some of the
responsibilities and powers of local authorities. The
Sharpeville crisis was again the watershed which greatly
accelerated these moves, presenting the BAD with an opportunity
for a more forceful attack. In 1959, as we have seen, the Durban
City Council had admitted all-round defeat in Cato Manor. And
in 1960, the government made much of the fact that
the disturbances took place especially in
areas where the local authorities are
controlled by opponents of government policy,
and it is veil known that the principles of
separate development have not always been
applied in the same good spirit as underlies
the aims of the government. (79)
The 1960 'Bantu in European Areas' Bill thus launched a
singularly aggressive onslaught on the powers of local
authorities, in a bid to increase the BAD's direct control over
the townships - a process which was to culminate, finally, in the
creation of the Administration Boards (completely under the BAD's
control) in 1971.
Finally, the BAD's policy-makers could abandon much of the
caution and pragmatism which marked the policies introduced in
the early 1950s, thanks to the growth in the NP's electoral
support. The 1960 Republican referendum, during which the white
electorate voted for the country to become a republic, gave the
NP its first outright majority of votes: 850 458 voted with the
NP, and 775 878 voted against - a majority of approximately 52%.
Shortly afterwards, the NP won the 1961 election with a majority
of 53% of the vote (80).
To conclude, this paper has challenged the prevailing picture of
the development of Apartheid, as the enactment of a single, long-
term 'grand plan', in three respects. We have seen, firstly, that
despite certain obvious and important continuities, there is
nevertheless a sufficiently striking disjuncture between the
NAD's policies in the 1950s and 1960s as to warrant the notion of
two distinct phases in the development of Apartheid before the
current 'reform' era. Each phase was marked by certain
distinctive features. One of the hallmarks of the first phase
(1948 - 1959/60), when compared with previous decades, was a new
order and intensity of repression suffered by blacks. Also, the
Nationalist government's policies were more systematic and
ideologically cohesive than those of its predecessors. One of
the distinctive features of the first phase, when compared with
the second (1960/1 - 1976/8), was the state's relatively
'practical' approach to the dilemmas presented by the growth of
20
the urban African proletariat. During the first phase, the NAD's
policy-makers set out to tackle these 'problems' by strengthening
and expanding the repressive powers of the state. Confident that
these moves would be sufficient to subvert the threat of
insurrection, and taking a pragmatic stance on 'economic
integration', the architects of NAD policy did not set out to
fetter industrial dependence on African labour. Nor did they
dispute the existence of a "detribalised" African community, and
its "residential right" to remain in the urban areas, whether
ministering to white needs or not. Also, although the NAD
tightened its grip over the local authorities, they remained the
principal agents of "urban native administration", with a
considerable degree of independence and power. During the 1960s,
however, the BAD disputed its earlier position on "economic
integration", challenged the very concept of "residential rights"
for urbanised Africans, and declared the necessity for new forms
of social and economic engineering to curtail the size of the
urban proletariat. Moreover, this policy shift was accompanied
by the increasing centralisation of administrative powers in the
hands of the BAD itself.//Secondly, these changes were not wholly
pre-planned. They were facilitated by a new configuration of
political forces, and were triggered in response to pressures and
problems of the historical moment. And thirdly* these changes
were not simply the next stage in a systematic and cumulative
process, in which each step builds on the successes of the last.
The changes in the design of BAD policies in the 1960s reflected
an attempt by the BAD to undo what it then perceived to be the
errors of its previous policies.
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